Ever since this summer, I have been particularly sensitive about the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
It all started with this article called "The Devil's Bargain" in July 2011's Reason Magazine. The author's premise is plea bargaining undermines justice. 95% of cases are resolved by plea bargains -- "this standard operating procedure was not contemplated by the Framers [of the Constitution]."
In fact, the Constitution says “the Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury.” It is evident that jury trials were supposed to play a central role in the administration of American criminal justice. But as the Yale law professor John Langbein noted in a 1992 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy article, “There is an astonishing discrepancy between what the constitutional texts promise and what the criminal justice system delivers.”
No one ever proposed a radical restructuring of the criminal justice system, one that would replace jury trials with a supposedly superior system of charge-and-sentence bargaining. Like the growth of government in general, plea bargaining slowly crept into and eventually grew to dominate the system.
The article explains the Government likes plea bargaining because it saves time and money. In addition, prosecutors and judges "acquire more influence over case outcomes." Furthermore, says the author, plea bargaining also limits scrutiny of investigatory agencies' conduct, how the Government or State resolves cases, etc. No juries (and maybe no judges, either) will hear about arguably illegal searches or seizures, evidentiary problems, misconduct, etc. - and, consequently, neither will the public.
[Caveat: I am not saying plea bargaining is always bad. I am not saying prosecutors (or judges) always wield the hammer given to them by lawmakers. I am not saying investigatory agencies are always suspect. In reality, sometimes a combination or all of the parties involved in a case try to figure out how to avoid the heavy hammer because it is contrary to what is just in that case. While a plea bargaining system is largely controlled by the Government or State, the source of that power is laws passed by lawmakers. So what I am saying is this system has problems, as discussed throughout this post.]
This accountability/transparency idea struck me when I read this article last week about Justice Clarence Thomas giving a talk at the University of Kentucky.
[Justice Thomas] made big news today by revealing the obvious: Oral arguments aren't that big of a deal—especially to Thomas, who has gone more than six years without asking a single question at a hearing. Referring to the discourse between justices and lawyers, Thomas told a University of Kentucky audience, "I see no need for all of that. Most of that is in the briefs, and there are a few questions around the edges."
The article ends with:
Still, even though health care oral arguments may not have been that important to the justices, it doesn't mean they aren't consequential to the public at large. That's why last month's charade got so much attention: The arguments weren't influencing the justices, necessarily, but they gave the public a window into the disposition of the members of the court, which ended up revealing that yes, five justices could conceivably rule against the individual mandate.
I disagree with some of the points and characterizations, but the conclusion makes my point. What does (or doesn't) happen in courtrooms is consequential to us as people in this country. When constitutional rights are at issue, we should have a window into the proceeding. That's why the Framers included "public" in front of "trial" in the Sixth Amendment.

me in front of the U.S. Supreme Court last summer (the crazy but informative taxi driver giving us a whirlwind tour while the children slept in the backseat risked a ticket to stop long enough for me to jump out and have my mom snap this picture)
But back to the Reason article. The author concludes:
The most common apologia for plea bargaining is a pragmatic argument: Courthouses are so busy that they would grind to a halt if every case, or even a substantial share of them, went to trial. But there is nothing inevitable about those crushing caseloads. Politicians chose to expand the list of crimes, eventually turning millions of Americans into criminals. . . .
In any case, trials are one of the few things the government indisputably should be spending money on. . . . The administration of justice ought to be a top priority of government. (Emphasis mine.)
It's that last part I keep coming back to (and - spoiler alert - how this post ends): why is saving money by avoiding jury trials - or avoiding jury trials in the first place in 95% of cases - in criminal cases seen as such a positive?
Then last month I saw this editorial called "Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System" in the Sunday New York Times. Michelle Alexander, author of The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (a book that has been in my bedside stack since the summer), talks about a conversation she had with Susan Burton, a woman who runs five safe homes for formerly incarcerated women (and who was incarcerated herself earlier in life). Ms. Burton asked Ms. Alexander, "Can we crash the system just by exercising our rights?"
The answer is yes. The system of mass incarceration depends almost entirely on the cooperation of those it seeks to control. If everyone charged with crimes suddenly exercised his constitutional rights, there would not be enough judges, lawyers or prison cells to deal with the ensuing tsunami of litigation....
Such chaos would force mass incarceration to the top of the agenda for politicians and policy makers, leaving them only two viable options: sharply scale back the number of criminal cases filed (for drug possession, for example) or amend the Constitution (or eviscerate it by judicial “emergency” fiat). Either action would create a crisis and the system would crash — it could no longer function as it had before. Mass protest would force a public conversation that, to date, we have been content to avoid.

untouched photo - this is really what the stack looks like (sadly)
But right now, "in this era of mass incarceration — when our nation’s prison population has quintupled in a few decades partly as a result of the war on drugs and the 'get tough' movement — these rights are, for the overwhelming majority of people hauled into courtrooms across America, theoretical." In this era of mandatory minimums, "three strikes" laws, disproportionate sentences, etc., it is too risky for people to exercise their right to a jury trial. People waive their right to a jury trial and plead in order to get home sooner rather than later (or not at all), to get out of jail, to get to treatment, etc. "The result is a dramatic power shift, from judges to prosecutors," who control charging, what plea is acceptable, etc.
(And speaking of forcing this topic to the top of the legislative agenda, remember my post from January before the start of the session. Kansas had 99 sentencing law changes since 2005 "to make sure crime does not pay". The result has been prison overcapacity. It is my opinion this session has not and will not produce much meaningful relief on this front. The erosion of the jury trial right caused by legislative enactments affects people who pay taxes that fund the criminal justice system and corrections. That's you.)
This "standard operating procedure" of plea bargaining impacts another Sixth Amendment guarantee. About three weeks ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Missouri v. Frye, which holds the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected because that right applies to “all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.”
. . . the State contends, it is unfair to subject it to the consequences of defense counsel’s inadequacies, especially when the opportunities for a full and fair trial, or, as here, for a later guilty plea albeit on less favorable terms, are preserved. The State’s contentions are neither illogical nor without some persuasive force, yet they do not suffice to overcome a simple reality. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. [I omitted the citations, which are lengthy.] The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages. Because ours “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,” Lafler, post, at 11, it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. “To a large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992).(Emphasis mine.)
While I could take offense at my work being referred to as "horse trading", I won't and I can't. That is sometimes how it feels. Sometimes I feel like I am negotiating a car purchase, and it makes me feel sick. Frankly, sometimes it makes everyone involved feel bad: prosecutors, judges, law enforcement officers, probation officers, etc. People try to reconcile justice with the heavy hammer of statutory law passed by policymakers.
I am glad the Court tells it like it is. And the Court points out another consequence of how our system does business:
[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes. This often results in individuals who accept a plea bargain receiving shorter sentences than other individuals who are less morally culpable but take a chance and go to trial. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1034 (2006).(Emphasis mine.)
[Post-publishing note: today I came across this article in the NY Times from 9/25/11. In retrospect, I think my husband showed it to me back then because it looks familiar. Anyway, it basically makes the points I do above, only way better and with lots more authorities weighing in.]
Even if you are not involved in the criminal justice system and/or think you never will be an accused and/or think our current system is acceptable, etc. - please at least consider these other ways the erosion of the jury trial right negatively affects all of us.
Speaking of culpability, during this legislative session I testified in opposition to SB 307, which specifically excludes any lesser-included offenses ever being given to a jury for consideration in a felony murder case. In other words, regardless of the strength of the State's evidence in a felony murder prosecution, the jury's choices will be guilty of felony murder or an acquittal. This is the only charge in our criminal code this exclusion applies to -- in every other prosecution (including those more serious than felony murder), the judge (often at the request of the defendant and/or the prosecutor) will continue to review the evidence to determine whether a jury could reasonably convict of a lesser-included offense. If so, the jury would be given that option in jury instructions.
Thank goodness for my friend Randall, who wrote our testimony and made sure I understood it (no easy task on either count). Here is the part about the role of Kansans in the jury trial right:
The right to a jury trial is fundamental under the United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution. A critical component of the right to a jury trial is the jury’s responsibility to finally determine whether the prosecution has proved its charges beyond a reasonable doubt or whether the prosecution has proved some lesser-included offense. This is a critical check on the prosecutor’s unbridled power to charge or to overcharge offenses.
By providing for the possibility of consideration of lesser-included offenses, the Kansas Constitution and Kansas law properly assigns to twelve Kansas citizens the role of being final arbiters of guilt across the criminal code. The proponents have not suggested any reason why Kansas citizens should have any different or lesser role in felony murder cases.
Under SB 307, juries would not even be given the option of finding the appropriate level of culpability in most or any cases. SB 307 would force juries into an all-or-nothing proposition in felony murder cases. So even in scenarios where the jury has a reasonable doubt whether the state proved felony murder, but has no reasonable doubt regarding a lesser homicide, the jury would have to choose between acquitting a person (a difficult proposition when there is a tragic loss of life) and convicting a person of felony murder even though jurors had a reasonable doubt regarding that charge.
Before I testified, one of the proponents said the only person affected by this change is the person on trial, since it could mean the difference between a life sentence (felony murder is life with no parole eligibility for 20 years) or something less. I pointed out this change could make a difference not only for a defendant, but also for a victim's family. If a jury is given the choice between felony murder or nothing, it could end up not reaching a verdict (making a retrial a possibility). A jury could acquit. Either way, that would impact a victim's family. It also affects the Kansas citizens who are put into this difficult position as jurors. And now it occurs to me that it affects the public as a whole -- communities are affected when someone is held more culpable or less culpable than he/she should be because of the choice between felony murder or nothing.
But it goes beyond just this example. If 94% of state convictions and 97% of federal convictions are the result of pleas, think about the impact on defendants and their families. And victims and their families. And our communities. Don't tell me this system doesn't create injustices where many people are treated too harshly (or where innocent people plead to something for the reasons discussed earlier) while others are not treated harshly enough.
Last example of why I fear for the jury trial right. A few weeks ago, I was graciously given a last-minute chance to argue in front of a conference committee (three Representatives and three Senators appointed to work out differences between the other chamber's version of a bill) against criminalizing refusals of blood, breath and/or urine tests when one is suspected of DUI. Under current law, refusing to submit to such a test leads to administrative penalties (driver's license suspension for a year, followed by required ignition interlock for 1-10 years depending on prior record of refusals) and the refusal can be used against a person in a criminal proceeding (ex. DUI trial). SB 453 will make refusal a crime with the exact same punishment as DUI itself. (By the way, there were 4,837 refusals in Kansas in 2011. Those would no longer be administratively handled - they would be misdemeanors or felonies with mandatory jail time of various lengths, depending on a person's history.)
I understand why many people think this is a good idea. I am not trying to go light on suspected drunk drivers. I am trying to look at the possible immediate and long-term consequences of this major policy change. I suggested another option (not an original thought - thankfully people help me with ideas): make it worse administratively when a person refuses. I spoke to the fact SB 453 increases the amount of ignition interlock time a person would get for a refusal, so let's give that a chance to take effect. (Later I was happy to see this article about how alcohol-related traffic fatalities have decreased from 138 in 2010 to 76 in 2011 - one contributing factor is thought to be ignition interlock.) I pointed out there is currently no fine for refusal. If the legislature imposed a hefty fine, that would be an incentive for people to take the test (and refusing would cost the offender, not the taxpayers).
The main reason given by those who want criminalization dealt with jury trials. The proponents said when people refuse the test, it makes it harder to prove the DUI at a jury trial. In Johnson County, a majority of jury trials are DUI cases where the defendant refused the test. Courts and prosecutors say there is a cost in time and money to have these cases go to trial. The increase in the number of jury trials is the concern. (As one legislator put it days prior, "there will be prosecutors across the state rejoicing" over the criminalization of refusals.)
Nervous and near tears by this point (this jury trial right concern had been rolling around in my head for nine months), I responded: I thought that was the point of our Constitutions. I thought the federal and state constitutions guaranteed a defendant the right to a jury trial and to have the State prove all of the elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. I thought that was part of why we have courts and prosecutors. And what do those comments say about juries? If it is "hard to make their case" even when the jury is told the person refused a test, then maybe the jurors didn't think or questioned whether the person was guilty of DUI. Are they not entitled to have the State meet its burden?
Bottom line: If we start using this reasoning - i.e. too many people are exercising their right to a jury trial and/or the State is finding its cases "harder to prove" - to criminalize certain acts or to make other policy choices, then it's all over as far as I'm concerned.
What stops us from tumbling down a slippery slope once we start? Maybe people aren't up for "crashing the system" per se, but I sure hope people will at least question it. And ask their policymakers to do the same.
P.S. I forgot to mention the felony murder bill is basically a done deal as is the criminalizing refusals. However, I keep a sliver of hope on the latter (just because I can't let things go - obviously). :) But even so, we can still make our thoughts known on issues generally even if a specific proposal is not on the table.
P.S. #2 Another post-publishing note: this morning (4/12) I saw an article about Trayvon Martin's parents on the Today show. It says, in part:
"I believe it was an accident," Fulton [Trayvon's mother] said. "I believe that it just got out of control, and he couldn't turn the clock back. . . .
Zimmerman, who is being charged with second-degree murder, is currently being held in protective custody at the Seminole County jail, awaiting a court appearance. Earlier in the interview, Fulton said she is prepared to endure the trial, "even if that means that he may be found not guilty." "We just want him to be held accountable for what he's done," Fulton said. "And by him not being arrested, that would not have been done. So we are happy that he was arrested so that the committee gives his side of the story." (Emphasis mine.)
Sometimes these posts just write themselves.
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